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


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AIR COMMAND AND STAFF COLLEGE

STUDENT REPORT

INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT TO RAPID-RESPONSE WARFIGHTERS

MAJOR DAVID M.A. DOCKHAM II 88-0760

"insights into tomorrow"

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Submitted to the faculty in partial fulfillment of requirements for graduation.

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Recent low intensity conflict or unconventional warfare operations have demonstrated the importance of providing fused, real time intelligence to the rapid-response warfighter. This study evaluates the functional structure of the intelligence agencies and their ability to use information processing and communications to provide intelligence to warfighting commanders. The study concludes that while problems in information processing and communications exist, the major problem in providing intelligence is the lack of a functional structure within the intelligence community. A possible solution to the lack of structure is offered as a recommendation.

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PREFACE

This project reviews problems and possibilities in providing real or near-real time intelligence to the commanders of rapid-response military forces. As Colonel Beckwith, Ground Force Commander of the Iran Rescue, put it:

> The vital importance of good, sound intelligence cannot be stressed enough. Without it there is nothing, with it there is something. It's the difference between failure and success, between humiliation and pride, between losing lives and saving them. Intelligence is to special operations as numbers are to a mathematician (2:223).

The United States military currently finds itself facing a spectrum of missions generally characterized as Low Intensity Conflict (LIC). LIC envelopes counterterrorism and the selected use of rapid-response forces (usually small) in achieving limited military objectives, without the total committment of the U.S. in a conventional war. If an analogy is appropriate: the U.S. military now finds it necessary to wield a surgeon's scalpel rather than the wrecker's ball in the achievement of national objectives.

The wielding of a scalpel requires definitive intelligence to ensure the precise excising of the malignant tumor. That intelligence must be precise, constantly available, and current, or it is of no use to the surgeon.

This study examines some recent breakdowns and achievements in the provision of that intelligence and offers a possible solution to the consistent availability of comprehensive intelligence to warfighting commanders in LIC.

This study could not have been completed without the inspiration and assistance of Colonel Leonard A. Butler, USAF, Senior Course Director, Joint Flag Officers Warfighting Course, Air University, and Lt. Colonel Larry D. Daniel, USAF, Chief, Curriculum Division, Air Command and Staff College Associate Programs.

The author would also like to thank Mrs. Jan Dockham for her long hours at the computer keyboard preparing, editing, and redrafting. Without her dedicated efforts, this study would still be unfinished.

ABOUT THE AUTHOR

Major David M.A. Dockham II received his undergraduate degree in business from Golden Gate University in San Francisco and his master's degree in business (MBS) from Troy State University. After commissioning, he served as an Air Weapons Director at Cannon AFB, New Mexico, Hessisch Oldendorf Air Station, Federal Republic of Germany, and as Chief, Radar Standardization and Evaluation at Osan AB, Republic of Korea. Major Dockham spent four years with Tactical Air Command's Inspector General as a Tactical Air Control System (TACS) Inspector and as Chief of the TACS operations inspection branch. His duties included inspection planning and inspection team management during the course of evaluating the combat readiness of over 50 Tactical Air Command units. His most recent assignment was on the staff of the Commander in Chief Pacific, as a Command, Control and Communications Interoperability Planner in the Directorate of Command, Control and Communications. His responsibilities included planning for and ensuring compatible joint and combined tactical communications in the Pacific Command. Major Dockham has completed Squadron Officers' School, Marine Corps Command and Staff, and the Air Command and Staff College's correspondence programs. He is currently enrolled in the resident Air Command and Staff College program. Major Dockham is married to the former Janet Fafara of Warren, Rhode Island and has two children, Katherine and Scott.

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Part of our College mission is distribution of the students' problem solving products to DOD sponsors and other interested agencies to enhance insight into contemporary, defense related issues. While the College has accepted this product as meeting academic requirements for graduation, the views and opinions expressed or implied are solely those of the author and should not be construed as carrying official sanction.

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REPORT NUMBER 88-0760

AUTHOR(S) MAJOR DAVID M.A. DOCKHAM II

TITLE INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT TO RAPID-RESPONSE WARFIGHTERS

I. Purpose: To determine how well intelligence has supported rapid-response warfighters in the past, to discover where the problems are, and to recommend possible solutions.

II. Problem: Rapid-response force commanders face a myriad of world-wide missions which require the provision of the most up-to-date, fused intelligence on a continuous, real or near-real time basis for successful mission accomplishment. The national capability to provide accurate continuous intelligence in support of these forces is critical to the achievement of national objectives.

III. Data: The study examines four recent commitments of rapid-response forces and the role of intelligence in the satisfactory accomplishment of the mission. For the purpose of this project, the output of the intelligence agencies is examined for functional organization, capability to communicate the intelligence, and ability to use automated data processing as both a dissemination tool and as a means of fusing

data from various sources into finished intelligence. The study assumes the capability to collect information and does not examine the information input to the various intelligence agencies.

IV. Conclusion: Rapid-response forces have complex missions which must frequently be initiated on short notice. Intelligence support to these missions is vital to successful mission accomplishment but has not always been provided on either a timely, nor understandable basis. While communications and automated data processing problems play a role in the rapid dissemination of intelligence, the major obstacle to effective intelligence support to warfighters has been the absence of an effective coordinating organization, charged with the responsibility to analyze and disseminate intelligence to warfighters in low intensity conflict.

V. Recommendation: The Commander in Chief, Special Operations Command, use this study to gain a consolidated intelligence center dedicated to providing fused near-real time intelligence to rapid-response forces.

Chapter One

INTRODUCTION AND TREATMENT

In 1984, Dr. Roger K. Engel, the Director of Tactical Intelligence Systems, Office of the Assistant Deputy Under Secretary of Defense (Intelligence) wrote: "As the battlefield has changed, so have the requirements for intelligence support. Intelligence support is now stressed by a compressed time frame, extended geography, expanded requirements and increased exposure to enemy actions" (11:47). If the spectrum of conflict now includes the battlefield of low intensity conflict, Dr. Engel has neatly encapsulated the needs of rapid-response force commanders for real time, all-source, fused intelligence on objectives which could be anywhere in the world.

The objective of this paper is to examine how well intelligence has supported the rapid-response force commander in several recent contingency situations, and by analysis of the functional dissemination of intelligence, reach conclusions and recommendations for improvement.

The analysis will examine the intelligence community structure, and its interface with the operational community through communications and automated data processing capability in disseminating finished (fused) intelligence in time to affect the operational commander's decisions and planning, for and during, low intensity conflict operations.

In a 1980 article, Dr. Michael C. Ryan developed ten variables in assessing the possibilities of success of a combat rescue operation, an element of low intensity conflict. Of those ten he stated:

> The first hypothesis is that success is critically dependent on assessment (the collection, evaluation, and dissemination of information), which drives the planning, training, and execution of the operation. Assessment requires (1) the continual modification of planning, training, and execution based on the latest intelligence; (2) centralized, integrated, and coordinated assessment efforts; and (3) the maximum use of the widest range of assessment assets (4:198).

In evaluating three pre-1980 U.S. rescue operations, he discovered that, of all the variables, assessment (intelligence) played the critical role in the success of the operation (4:TBL 12-3).

This paper will examine recent U.S. low intensity conflict operations, and through an analysis of the structure which supports intelligence dissemination, determine where improvements can be made.

Chapter Two

AN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE

This chapter will examine four recent U.S. military operations and the role of intelligence in their execution. The operations themselves, the Iran Hostage Rescue, the Grenada Rescue, the Beirut Bombing, and the Achille Lauro Hijackers Intercept, range from single service, small unit to fairly large joint force operations which had planning periods ranging from several hours up to six months for their preparation. While no one operation can be considered to be a carbon copy of the other, each was a low intensity conflict operation, and empirical conclusions on the role of intelligence support in each operation can be drawn. The operations will be examined in the chronological order of their execution with a brief synopsis of each mission. Following each synopsis, intelligence and intelligence communications support to the operation will be examined. The first operation was initiated as a result of the seizure of U.S. citizens by the revolutionary forces of what is now, and was then, a hostile state.

Iran Hostage Rescue

The Iran Hostage Rescue Mission was initiated by President Carter on 4 November 1979 as a result of the seizure of U.S. citizens (primarily diplomatic personnel) by revolutionary forces in Iran. The operation was launched on 24 April 1980 and was cancelled in the Iranian desert when insufficient flyable helicopters arrived to complete the mission of rescuing the U.S. hostages (1:276).

Intelligence played a vital role in the mission planning for the operation. As the Holloway afteraction report on the mission explained:

> COMJTF, his staff, and subordinate commanders were fully aware that successful mission accomplishment would critically depend on precise and timely intelligence and, moreover, that intelligence would tend to drive the operation from conception to execution (18:19).

During the course of mission planning, the Joint Task Force

(JTF) intelligence staff increased from one to four intelligence officers, and external agency liaison officers were attached early in the planning stages (18:19). "In some ways, however, certain elements of the Intelligence Community seemed slow in harnessing themselves initially for the tasks at hand" (18:19). The consequence of this activity was that the JTF J-2 was effectively overwhelmed by the volume of unanalyzed reports which found their way to the intelligence desks. Frequently, reports had little or no relevance to the rescue operation, but required intensive reading to ensure they were not applicable (1:197). Interestingly, it was an item of human intelligence which arrived the night prior to mission launch which had great impact on the mission.

> One of the U.S. Embassy's cooks was permitted to leave Iran. Reportedly, on the plane a CIA agent managed to sit next to him. This cook not only knew where the guards were stationed but where all their prisoners were being held... The information that was passed reported that all 53 hostages would be found in the chancellery (1:264).

This information's significant impact was that it reduced the JTF assault mission from a planned attack on four facilities to a need for just one assault, thus greatly simplifying the mission with concomitant increase in the JTF's ability to exploit surprise and concentration of force (1:264). Still, the Holloway report determined:

> [While] initial difficulties in the intelligence support arena had been largely overcome by the time the operation was launched... Intelligence Community assets and resources could have been pulled together more quickly and effectively than was actually the case... and recommended that a preferred approach would have been to task the Director, DIA, to establish a small and highly select interagency Intelligence Task Force (ITF) in direct support of the JTF from the moment of operational concept (18:20).

Such an arrangement:

> ...would have the advantage of harnessing selected elements of the U.S. Intelligence Community and bringing them together as an integrated intelligence supporting mechanism on extremely short notice. Fragmentation of responsibility for intelligence support would be avoided, as the Director, DIA, in his role as J-2 to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, would be

clearly charged with overall supervision and given the necessary authority (18:20).

Communications' support to the Iran Rescue Operation was excellent. The extended planning cycle provided ample time to properly plan and deploy the capability for end-to-end communications. This was particularly useful in providing the "night before" information on hostage location (1:273,277).

In short, while early efforts to coordinate intelligence for the JTF were fragmented, the Intelligence Community did provide successful support, particularly on the eve of the mission, when the JTF was out of the country and enroute to the target. However, it must be remembered that from conception to execution, the mission was in planning for several months. The next example had a much shorter planning phase.

Grenada Rescue

This operation again involved joint forces, but on a much larger scale, and this force was planned under a unified command as the entity responsible for actually employing combat forces. The Grenada Rescue Operation involved over 6,000 members of the Army, Marines, Navy, and Air Force and was more reminiscent of a World War II Pacific Amphibious Assault than the covert and selected use of unconventional warfare forces. Yet, the SEALS were involved as were AC-130 gunships and the Army's Rangers and airborne rapid-response forces. The operation itself was a success and resulted in the rescue of 595 students and U.S. citizens who were in imminent danger from a breakdown of the rule of law on that island. The planning phase of the Grenada operation occupied approximately 96 hours from CINCLANT notification until actual troops were on the ground. This was an extremely short period in which to orchestrate four services in what is uniformly accepted as the most difficult military operation: putting troops ashore on a hostile shore (21:--).

Admiral McDonald, Commander in Chief, Atlantic, who controlled the operation stated before the Committee on Armed Services that:

> We had basic intelligence sufficient to start the noncombat evacuation operation [a previously considered option which was overtaken by events]. We knew the buildup that was taking place in Grenada as far as the runway and the support facilities were concerned. We knew about how many Cubans were there. I think the estimate was about 600. We knew

> about the number of People's Revolutionary Army which was estimated to be about 1200. That turned out to be a reasonable figure. And so, in a general overall sense, the national intelligence agencies provided us with an adequate overview of Grenada... (21:24).

However, "General John A. Wickham, Jr. pointed to military intelligence shortcomings, noting that more adequate knowledge of the Cuban anti-aircraft capability might have averted some helicopter loses" (2:56). And, according to Vice Admiral Joseph Metcalf III, the U.S. Commander for the operation, "Advance Intelligence was not what we would have desired" (2:56). Additional testimony during the Committee on Armed Services Hearing indicated that: "[It was] learned that night [some twelve hours after the initial landings] because that students [themselves] informed the U.S. Forces, that over at Grand Anse Campus, which was another part of the medical school, there were reported to be 180 American students over there" (21:22). In fact, in spite of "...the policy priority accorded to the Grenada threat for several years...dat[ing] back to the Carter administration.." (2:57), U.S. intelligence about student locations, the purported objective of the operation, was not provided to the forces prior to the landing (2:90).

Communications' support was adequate within the individual services during this operation, however, the operation itself was characterized by inadequate interservice communications planning and interoperability. While the lack of joint interoperability complicated the actual operation, it had little or no impact on the dissemination of intelligence since the forces involved were left to their own tactical intelligence efforts (21:22).

The Grenada Rescue Operation was an unqualified success, but the outcome could have been much worse had the Grenadians decided to harm the students, for there was sufficient time to do so. In fact, the location of approximately half of the students was not determined until 12 hours into the operation. This lack of intelligence could have been critical to the ultimate success of the operation.

Beirut Marine Barracks Bombing

Turning next to the disaster which befell the Marine U.S. Multinational Force (USMNF) in Beirut, Lebanon on 23 October 1983, the situation changes. The force involved was overwhelmingly single service which, although considered a conventional force, is by doctrine, a rapid-response force charged

with using U.S. military power on short notice. In fact, the USMNF had been on the ground in Beirut for a number of months, in static positions, with a well-organized command structure. In this instance, intelligence requirements of the combat force were similar to those of the Grenada Rescue Operation where information on hostile artillery positions, tanks, and militia strongholds was needed (16:63). According to the Report of the Department of Defense Commission on Beirut International Airport Terrorist Act: "Intelligence support to conventional, tactical military requirements received praise from many in the administrative and operational chains of command" (16:63). Unfortunately, the Commission also found that: "Throughout the period of the USMNF presence in Lebanon, intelligence sources were unable to provide proven, accurate, definitive information on terrorist tactics against our forces" (16:64).

The report also indicated that while the broadening threat to the USMNF was well recognized at the National Command Authority level and throughout the chain of command "It should be noted that the FBI report on the 18 April 1983 bombing of the U.S. Embassy in Beirut, a report which described the use of explosive-activated bottle bombs in that incident, stayed within FBI, CIA, and Department of State Channels" (16:63). The Commission concluded that:

> The USMNF Commander received volumes of intelligence information, but none specific enough to have enabled the prevention of the attack or provide him other than general warning. There was no institutionalized process for the fusion of intelligence disciplines into an all-source support mechanism (16:65).

Strikingly, the Commission recommended that:

> Our military forces (and especially ground forces) need to have aggressive, specific intelligence to give the commander the hard information he needs to counter the threat against his force. U.S. intelligence is primarily geared for the support of air and naval forces engaged in nuclear and conventional warfare. Significant attention must be given by the entire U.S. Intelligence structure to purging and refining of masses of generalized information into intelligence analysis useful to small unit ground commanders (16:65).

Communications' support was obviously adequate to provide the USMNF commander with the appropriate information to accom-

plish his mission, but it was the focus of the intelligence effort and the lack of fusion of all-source information which played a part in the disaster.

Achille Lauro Hijackers Intercept

Finally, a brief look at another single service operation which was executed over a nine hour period with exceptional success. The USS Saratoga was tasked on 10 October 1985 to intercept and force down a Boeing 737 jetliner and apprehend terrorists responsible for the seizure of the cruise ship Achille Lauro and the murder of a U.S. passenger (12:30). On the basis of precise information about takeoff time and route of flight of the Boeing 737, F-14 Tomcats off the Saratoga successfully intercepted and forced the airliner to land at Sigonella Naval Air Station in Sicily (12:30).

Simply stated, while the absence of intelligence on the Boeing 737 would have totally prevented this operation, its presence provided the firm foundation for successful completion.

Communications' support through the Fleet Navy's Operations Support Information Center was obviously able to provide rapid dissemination of the required intelligence to the USS Saratoga, culminating in the successful conclusion of the mission.

Conclusion

Recent U.S. rapid-response force military operations highlight the critical need for real or near-real time availability and dissemination of fused intelligence to the tactical unit commander whether afloat, ashore, or in the air. As the Achille Lauro Airliner intercept demonstrated, effective intelligence provides the commander with information which effects the use of his forces. It provides him with the ability to exercise the principles of surprise, economy of force, and the primacy of the objective, where he cannot compensate with mass. This is the raison d'etre of special operations forces and small tactical forces - get in with a small specialized force, do the job, and get out. Conversely, the lack of adequate intelligence can result in disaster. Not only are national objectives not met, but the United States is subjected to humiliation when the effort fails. If the United States intends to use forces in the low intensity conflict arena, the forces must be provided the intelligence to accom-

plish that mission (4:198).

The functional organization which ties the diverse National Intelligence Agencies together will be examined next for its ability to support the above requirement.

Chapter Three

RESPONSIBILITIES OF INTELLIGENCE AGENCIES

As seen in Chapter Two, the coordinated development of fused intelligence is fundamental to the effective employment of military forces, particularly small, unconventional warfare, or rapid-response conventional warfare forces in situations which can generally be characterized as low intensity conflict operations. This chapter will examine the primary responsibilities of selected U.S. Intelligence Agencies for developing fused all-source intelligence. Beginning with the Agency responsible for "coordinating the intelligence activities of the several Government departments and agencies in the interest of national security" (19:28), this chapter will examine that coordination.

Central Intelligence Agency

The Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) was established under the authority of the National Security Act of 1947. The CIA's coordination duties, as set out in Sec. 102(d) of the Act are as follows:

(1) to advise the National Security Council in matters concerning such intelligence activities of the Government departments and agencies as relate to national security;
(2) to make recommendations to the National Security Council for the coordination of such intelligence activities of the departments and agencies of the Government as related to the national security;
(3) to correlate and evaluate intelligence relating to the national security, and provide for the appropriate dissemination of intelligence within the Government using where appropriate existing agencies and facilities.

Specifically, the CIA's Directorate of Intelligence (DDI) is

This Chapter (excluding the Conclusion section) was taken from The United States Intelligence Community: A Brief Description of Organization and Functions (Official Documents, Source 19) pages 28-43, edited by Major David M.A. Dockham II

responsible for assembling, analyzing and evaluating information from all sources to produce finished political, economic and military intelligence reports and to administer certain programs of common concern to the intelligence community.

Department of Defense

Within the Department of Defense, the Department of Defense Intelligence units fall under the responsibility of the Assistant Secretary of Defense [Command, Control, Communications and Intelligence] who is the principal point for management and policy coordination with the Director of Central Intelligence, the CIA, and the other intelligence officials and agencies outside the Department of Defense.

Defense Intelligence Agency

The Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) was established in 1961 for the purpose of rationalizing and unifying the intelligence efforts of the military through centralized management and greater coordination of intelligence activities.

The agency is responsible for:

(1) the organization, direction, management, and control of all Department of Defense intelligence resources assigned to or included within the DIA;
(2) review and coordination of those Department of Defense intelligence functions retained by or assigned to the military departments. Overall guidance for the conduct and management of such functions will be developed by the Director, DIA, for review, approval, and promulgation by the Secretary of Defense;
(3) supervision of the execution of all approved plans, programs, policies, and procedures for intelligence functions not assigned to DIA;
(4) obtaining the maximum economy and efficiency in the allocation and management of Department of Defense intelligence resources. This includes analysis of those DOD intelligence activities and facilities which can be fully integrated or collocated with non-DOD intelligence organizations;
(5) responding directly to priority requests levied upon the Defense Intelligence Agency by USIB;
(6) satisfying the intelligence requirements of the major components of the Department of Defense.

In essence, DIA is organized to provide finished foreign military intelligence to the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the major components of the Department of

Defense. The Director of DIA is the principal intelligence staff officer to both the Secretary of Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff, reporting to the Secretary through the Joint Chiefs. Within the DIA, the Directorate of Management and Plans is tasked to ensure that DOD intelligence products/services satisfy consumer requirements, and acts as the agency's formal point of contact for external matters.

National Security Agency

Also under the direction of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for C3I is: The super-secret National Security Agency (NSA) ...established in 1952 by Presidential directive as a separate agency within the Department of Defense under the direction and control of the Secretary of Defense. It has two primary missions: (1) security -- to protect U.S. communications from foreign intelligence exploitation, and (2) intelligence -- to exploit foreign communications in order to provide information to our own government.

To accomplish these missions the Director of NSA is tasked with the following responsibilities:

(1) prescribing certain security principles, doctrines, and procedures for the U.S. Government;
(2) organizing, operating, and managing certain activities and facilities for the production of intelligence information;
(3) organizing and coordinating the research and engineering activities of the U.S. Government which are in support of the Agency's assigned functions; and
(4) regulating certain communication in support of Agency missions.

Military Services Intelligence

In addition to the specialized functions of DIA and NSA, the DOD exercises policy responsibilities over the military services' specialized intelligence activities. The various military intelligence services control their own production activities, particularly tactical or combat intelligence affecting their operation.

Army Intelligence

Army Intelligence is tasked: to conduct operations, investigations, and services, to maintain and insure the security posture of the U.S. Army, appropriate elements of the Office of

the Secretary of Defense, and other U.S. Government agencies; to provide for the Secretary of the Army, Chief of Staff, Army Staff, and Army Commanders timely intelligence operations and information in support of the Army mission; to exercise control office function for counterintelligence investigations originating in CONUS Armies, U.S. Army overseas commands, and from authorized requestors in the Department of Defense and other U.S. Government agencies; to conduct sensitive and controlled intelligence operations worldwide; to provide to the Army, the Department of Defense, and other U.S. Government Agencies specialized intelligence, cover, and logistical support as directed.

Naval Intelligence

The mission of naval intelligence is to collect, process, evaluate, and disseminate intelligence of naval interest in order to advise the Secretary of the Navy, the Chief of Naval Operations, and Navy's technical bureaus and to appraise the effectiveness of established intelligence programs. The functions which the Naval Intelligence Command performs to carry out these basic missions include: preparing Naval intelligence inputs for Joint Chiefs of Staff estimates and studies; exchanging intelligence with other agencies in the community; keeping the Chief of Naval Operations informed as to the war-making capabilities and intentions of foreign nations; and providing scientific and technical analyses of foreign naval weapons and systems, and estimates of future weapon developments.

Marine Corps Intelligence

The U.S. Marine Corps maintains a small intelligence staff (G-2) at the Assistant Chief of Staff level. Marine Corps intelligence officers are billeted throughout the Corps and are concerned primarily with tactical, or operational, rather than national intelligence.

Air Force Intelligence

The Air Force maintains an extensive intelligence organization, reorganized several times since World War II, and is one of the chief consumers of and contributors to the national intelligence product. Air Force intelligence activities are headed by the Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence (ACS/I), whose responsibilities are providing the Secretary of the Air Force, the Chief of Staff, the Air Staff, and as required, Air Force commands and the Joint Staff with intelligence regarding

military threats to the security of the United States and Allies. Responsible for providing current all-source intelligence affecting, or potentially affecting, U.S. Air Force policies, resources, missions, weapons system acquisition, or force deployment and employments.

Conclusion

While the foregoing excursion through the responsibilities of the various intelligence agencies has been tedious, it highlights the responsibilities for coordinated dissemination of intelligence. The primary responsibility of each agency is to the service, agency or department it serves. Coordination is always a secondary task, and the primary emphasis is on the development of finished wide area intelligence reports. While it might appear that the Director of Central Intelligence should have this responsibility, Vice Admiral E. A. Burkhalter, Jr., USN, the Director of Intelligence Community Staff Office of the DCI, in a September 1984 article, cautioned his readers that:

> It is important to bear in mind that the DCI does not have command authority over the Intelligence Community; while the CIA answers directly to the DCI, each of the other 10 organizations in the community is responsible primarily to its respective department or source. The DCI, however, does exercise strong collegial leadership over the confederation of intelligence activities... particularly in matters of policy and resources (8:33).

The primary assigned task of national intelligence agencies is to provide national decision makers with the broad intelligence perspective required in the decision process for long range estimates and policy decisions.

However, the Secretary of Defense in his 1986 "Report to the Congress" acknowledged the need for a broader intelligence tasking:

> The overall goal for the intelligence program is to support user requirements at all levels. In this regard, we must ensure that the intelligence support structure essential for military operations is compatible with theater and service C3I architectures, interoperable with service systems, supported with assured wartime communications, and as survivable as the commands and forces supported (17:252).

As the Secretary further states, we have a problem with the

separation of our intelligence activities:

> Our intelligence activities are accounted for in two separate, but related programs; the National Foreign Intelligence Program (NFIP) and Tactical Intelligence and Related Activities (TIARA). The Director of Central Intelligence, under Presidential direction, provides guidance and manages the overall NFIP. TIARA programs, under OSD oversight, are developed and managed by the Services and Agencies in response to operational commanders' intelligence requirements. To strengthen interaction, an NFIP/TIARA Review Board was established this year to review interoperability, NFIP/TIARA technology transfer, and to ensure that there is no unnecessary duplication (17:252).

It is apparent then that there is a disconnect between a rapid-response force commander's need for real time fused national and tactical intelligence and the functional structure's ability to provide it. Under their current charters, the national intelligence structure is designed to provide long range analysis and finished assessment of capabilities. It is not designed to provide, particularly in the low intensity conflict arena, real time intelligence to a warfighting commander in time to affect operational decisions.

Perhaps in recognition of this and other factors, the 1986 Congress mandated the establishment of an additional unified command, the Special Operations Command (SOC), and an Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict. The commander of the Special Operations Command, would among other duties, be responsible for "developing intelligence requirements" (7:4). Public Law 99-433 Section 193 offers a route from the Commander, Special Operations Command, through the Joint Chiefs of Staff, to the Secretary of Defense to accomplish the above (15:100 STAT. 1021). As Senator William S. Cohen (R-ME) wrote in a 1986 article, prior to the establishment of the SOC, that a SOC would: "help facilitate the exchange of information between SOF and other agencies of the government. SOF units need good intelligence... a clean organizational focus for special operations could help to facilitate the flow of information in both directions" (9:44). Flow of information requires communications and information processing, the topic of the next chapter.

Chapter Four

COMMUNICATIONS AND INFORMATION PROCESSING

The real or near-real time dissemination of intelligence depends on the effective use of communications and the capability to efficiently use information processing techniques to develop intelligence from the information received by the intelligence agencies. Without the communications to feed the intelligence to the forces, no structural or functional intelligence capability can get the information where it is needed. The access to (communication of) intelligence is acknowledged by the Joint Staff in the U.S. Military Posture, FY 1988.

> Access to accurate, timely intelligence is essential for the NCA, JCS, and military commanders to effect timely political and military decisions. Intelligence provides decision-makers with assessments of enemy forces, capabilities, and probable courses of action (22:73).

Communications

The availability of secure satellite communications with deployed or enroute forces was a study assumption. However, a short review of the capabilities and limitations of those communications is desirable.

Satellite communications use different segments of the frequency spectrum to provide differing characteristics in data rate speed of transmission and assurance of transmission. Implicit in that statement is that satellite communications have limitations, both in area coverage, (particularly over the polar regions) and in capability to negate interference in the transmission media.

> From a communication point of view, there are three key parameters associated with an orbiting satellite: (1) coverage area, or the portion of the Earth's surface that can receive the satellite's transmissions with an elevation angle larger than a prescribed minimum angle. (2) the slant range (actual line-of-sight distance from a fixed point on the Earth to the

satellite) and (3) the length of time a satellite is visible with a prescribed elevation angle. Elevation angle is important since communications can be significantly impaired if the satellite must be viewed at a low elevation angle: that is, an angle too close to the horizon (3:14).

Communications provide the critical element in the real, near-real time factor of the equation on intelligence support to operational commanders. Lieutenant General James Williams, USA, then Director of DIA, wrote in 1984, that:

> Timeliness - Unacceptable delays in the delivery of time sensitive information can be attributed to a number of factors including but by no means limited to:
>
> - Increasing volume of intelligence.
> - Overloaded communications circuits.
> - Lack of interoperability, requiring, for example, manual tape transfers (14:25).

Lt. General Williams went on to write that:

> Within the intelligence community:
> - Systems planners and designers traditionally have ignored communications impacts other than those which directly affect the operation of the intelligence system being considered.
> - Coordination with the communications community is absent or inadequate.
> - Compared to the costs of collection and processing, relatively few resources have been spent on innovations to consolidate, synthesize and refine intelligence products to lower traffic volumes and reduce communications demands (14:26).

The Defense Intelligence Agency has developed a program to deal with the current communications shortfalls and projected communications requirements. That "...effort, called INCA--for Intelligence Communications Architecture--and supported by the Congress has both near and long-term goals" (14:25). The near-term goal is to solve critical intelligence communications problems while the long-term goal is to ensure that they do not recur (14:25).

When adequate communications do not exist, there is unfortunately: "a temptation to advocate bypassing processing

and production to deliver the raw collected data to the end user. This "fire hose" model of intelligence support will not provide near-real time intelligence support to the fighting forces" (17:44). The reader will recall from Chapter Two, that the "firehose" effect was apparent in two of the contingency examples. In fact, in 1984, Major General James C. Pfautz, then the Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Headquarters, USAF, wrote that: "New collection systems, prolific beyond yesterday's imagination, have the capability to deliver vast quantities of detailed information" (13:44).

The challenge that therefore faces the intelligence community according to Major General Schuyler Bissell (one of Major General Pfautz's successors) "...is the means to process and access more quickly the comprehensive combat data they are receiving. Automated Data Processing (ADP) technologies are made to order for such applications" (18:48).

Information Processing

It is evident that a point has been reached where intelligence information must be categorized into two distinct types. The first is the data base accumulation of all-source information. The sometimes slow aggregation of minor bits and pieces from all intelligence agencies which results in an historical basis to detect changes or analyze new items. The second type of intelligence is the perishable information, recognized as of immediate interest to the tactical commander and near instantaneously (i.e. without pausing to update and reanalyze the historical data) passed to the operational commander (13:44).

The Department of Defense has continued to rely on criteria established under the Intelligence Data Handling Systems (IDHS) to develop ADP systems. The systems criteria include timeliness of data transfer, interactive support, flexibility and capability to support crisis and contingency operation (20:4-8). Unfortunately, individually fielded intelligence systems, while complying with IDHS criteria, have met that criteria in terms of their own individual discipline and needs. For example: System processing rates for information can vary from 30 words per minute up to million of bytes per second (20:3-31 , 3-32). This processing disparity, along with different protocols, formats and computer language, has caused significant problems in the capability to interface the various intelligence systems in order to provide an all-source data base. Recognizing the problems has resulted in a DOD effort to develop authoritative, responsive, and updated data bases for worldwide use. The DOD Intelligence Information System (DODIIS)

is an effort to interface the various ADP systems to provide free and timely flow of information to the various users without the requirement for duplicative data bases (20:4-8).

This effort, as is the INCA project, is an ongoing project which will provide DODIIS users with relatively unhampered access to all intelligence data bases. DODIIS direct access users extend down to the unified and service major theater command and intelligence centers (20:4-9 , 4-10).

Conclusion

To conclude, virtually all of the intelligence services and agencies within DOD have recognized the need for rapid and responsive intelligence support to operational commanders. The services have not been lacking in describing their tactical needs: The Marines are developing MAGIC, the Marine Air-Ground Intelligence Cell, to provide operational support to the forces (10:77); the Air Force's Enemy Situation Correlation Element and the Army's All Source Analysis System are efforts to develop an "automated system that would correlate, analyze and distribute high volumes of time-sensitive intelligence data from a number of sensors" (5:38). The problem is that each organizational group is following its' organizational dictates and mounting a separate effort. The interaction of the various agencies in providing an interactive, all-source capability to rapid-response force commanders is, therefore, less than optimum.

Chapter Five

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

The problem of providing real time, all-source, including national level intelligence support, to rapid reaction operational commanders has not been solved, but efforts are under way to alleviate the problem.

It may be most instructive to return to the perspective of the spectrum of conflict. Starting at the top of the spectrum with strategic nuclear war, the intelligence required for that conflict has been satisfied by and for the organization which will fight it, the National Command Authorities. The national level intelligence structure (CIA, DIA, NSA, etc.) is designed to provide the real time fused intelligence support to accomplish that mission. Conventional war also has its own tactical intelligence structure through individual service efforts to provide tactical conventional intelligence support to theater warfighting commanders. It is the unconventional war, the low intensity conflict force which requires the detailed, objective intelligence which has not yet developed the intelligence system needed to fight its' war. Of the three elements (organization, communications and ADP) examined on U.S. capabilities to provide real time fused intelligence to rapid-response force commanders, communications and ADP have ongoing programs, INCA and DODIIS, which can provide the means of dissemination, display and commonality of intelligence data bases.

The primary problem in providing fused national and tactical intelligence has been an ineffective intelligence organizational structure. The means of providing intelligence has overcome the structural concepts necessary to the fusing and dissemination of all-source intelligence itself. Although numerous studies have recommended the overhaul of intelligence organization, most have been oriented toward individual service or agency requirements. One exception presented to the 1985 9th Air University Airpower Symposium and entitled Intelligence Support During Low Intensity Conflict recommended a model for the development of a Low Intensity Conflict Fusion, Exploitation, Processing, and Distribution Center (LICFEC). The Center could operate as either an arm of the DCI or of the DIA, but would be a 24 hour a day watch center similar to the unified

commands' Intelligence and Command Centers for conventional warfare and the National Military Command Center for strategic warfare. The LICFEC would be manned by representatives of all the national and DOD intelligence agencies and would be responsible for both the building of intelligence data bases appropriate to LIC and the operational responsibility to forward time sensitive information, from whatever source, to ongoing LIC operations (23:--).

In this regard, a final examination of the Navy's information dissemination system during the Achille Lauro hijackers intercept may be appropriate. The Navy's information mission requires the use of shore based communications and analysis centers to provide information to widely dispersed, relatively mobile units with rapid-response requirements in contingency situations. This service generic requirement is closely analogous to the requirements of all rapid-response forces. The Navy has structured Fleet Ocean Surveillance Information Centers (FOSICs) to meet this need, and it was the rapid transmission of a piece of vital intelligence which allowed the Saratoga to preposition its' interceptors and conduct a successful mission (10:75).

There is clearly a need to establish a similar capability to provide intelligence to the commanders of military forces faced with low intensity conflict missions.

Recommendations:

The Commander in Chief, Special Operations Command, taking full advantage of recent public law, should recommend and pursue the establishment of a Low Intensity Conflict Intelligence Center which would provide both fused and perishable intelligence on a real time basis to rapid-response force commanders. The recommendation for such a center should be made through the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict, who, in conjunction with the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Command, Control, Communications and Intelligence and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, should ensure the support of the Secretary of Defense during his biannual consultations with the DCI (15:100 STAT. 1020, 100 STAT. 1021).

The Commander in Chief, Special Operations Command, should actively pursue, through ongoing programs such as INCA and DODIIS, the development of communication and automated data processing equipment suitable for the requirements of rapid-response (Special Operating) forces.

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